Economic Analysis of Trade-offs between Justices
We argue that economics – as the scientific method of analysing trade-offs – can be helpful (and may even be indispensable) for assessing the trade-offs between intergenerational and intragenerational justice. Economic analysis can delineate the “opportunity set” of politics with respect to the two no...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Tübingen University
2012-05-01
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| Series: | Intergenerational Justice Review |
| Online Access: | https://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/459 |
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| _version_ | 1823861102249771008 |
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| author | Stefan Baumgärtner Stefanie Glotzbach Nikolai Hoberg Klara Helene Stumpf Martin F. Quaas |
| author_facet | Stefan Baumgärtner Stefanie Glotzbach Nikolai Hoberg Klara Helene Stumpf Martin F. Quaas |
| author_sort | Stefan Baumgärtner |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description |
We argue that economics – as the scientific method of analysing trade-offs – can be helpful (and may even be indispensable) for assessing the trade-offs between intergenerational and intragenerational justice. Economic analysis can delineate the “opportunity set” of politics with respect to the two normative objectives of inter- and intragenerational justice, i.e. it can describe which outcomes are feasible in achieving the two objectives in a given context, and which are not. It can distinguish efficient from inefficient uses of instruments of justice. It can identify the “opportunity cost” of attaining one justice to a higher degree, in terms of less achievement of the other. We find that, under very general conditions, (1) efficiency in the use of instruments of justice implies that there is rivalry between the two justices and the opportunity cost of either justice is positive; (2) negative opportunity costs of achieving one justice exist if there is facilitation between the two justices, which can only happen if instruments of justice are used inefficiently; (3) opportunity costs of achieving one justice are zero if the two justices are independent of each other, which is the case in the interior of the opportunity set where instruments of justice are used inefficiently.
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| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-6340d6019f004c299f862e9110139e01 |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 2190-6335 |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2012-05-01 |
| publisher | Tübingen University |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Intergenerational Justice Review |
| spelling | doaj-art-6340d6019f004c299f862e9110139e012025-02-10T05:00:37ZengTübingen UniversityIntergenerational Justice Review2190-63352012-05-011Economic Analysis of Trade-offs between JusticesStefan Baumgärtner0Stefanie Glotzbach1Nikolai Hoberg2Klara Helene Stumpf3Martin F. Quaas4Leuphana University of Lüneburg, Sustainability Economics GroupLeuphana University of Lüneburg, Sustainability Economics GroupLeuphana University of Lüneburg, Sustainability Economics GroupLeuphana University of Lüneburg, Sustainability Economics GroupUniversity of Kiel, Institute of Economics We argue that economics – as the scientific method of analysing trade-offs – can be helpful (and may even be indispensable) for assessing the trade-offs between intergenerational and intragenerational justice. Economic analysis can delineate the “opportunity set” of politics with respect to the two normative objectives of inter- and intragenerational justice, i.e. it can describe which outcomes are feasible in achieving the two objectives in a given context, and which are not. It can distinguish efficient from inefficient uses of instruments of justice. It can identify the “opportunity cost” of attaining one justice to a higher degree, in terms of less achievement of the other. We find that, under very general conditions, (1) efficiency in the use of instruments of justice implies that there is rivalry between the two justices and the opportunity cost of either justice is positive; (2) negative opportunity costs of achieving one justice exist if there is facilitation between the two justices, which can only happen if instruments of justice are used inefficiently; (3) opportunity costs of achieving one justice are zero if the two justices are independent of each other, which is the case in the interior of the opportunity set where instruments of justice are used inefficiently. https://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/459 |
| spellingShingle | Stefan Baumgärtner Stefanie Glotzbach Nikolai Hoberg Klara Helene Stumpf Martin F. Quaas Economic Analysis of Trade-offs between Justices Intergenerational Justice Review |
| title | Economic Analysis of Trade-offs between Justices |
| title_full | Economic Analysis of Trade-offs between Justices |
| title_fullStr | Economic Analysis of Trade-offs between Justices |
| title_full_unstemmed | Economic Analysis of Trade-offs between Justices |
| title_short | Economic Analysis of Trade-offs between Justices |
| title_sort | economic analysis of trade offs between justices |
| url | https://igjr.org/ojs/index.php/igjr/article/view/459 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT stefanbaumgartner economicanalysisoftradeoffsbetweenjustices AT stefanieglotzbach economicanalysisoftradeoffsbetweenjustices AT nikolaihoberg economicanalysisoftradeoffsbetweenjustices AT klarahelenestumpf economicanalysisoftradeoffsbetweenjustices AT martinfquaas economicanalysisoftradeoffsbetweenjustices |