Does the “state of disaster” response have a downside? Hospital incident command group leaders’ experiences of a terrorist-induced major incident: a qualitative study
Abstract Aim This study explores HICGs’ experience of disaster response during a terrorist-induced major incident major incident. Design A qualitative descriptive design with individual semi-structured interviews was used. Methods This was a qualitative study based on seven individual interviews. Pa...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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BMC
2025-02-01
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| Series: | BMC Emergency Medicine |
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1186/s12873-025-01173-4 |
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| author | Jason P. Murphy Anna Hörberg Monica Rådestad RN Lisa Kurland Maria Jirwe |
| author_facet | Jason P. Murphy Anna Hörberg Monica Rådestad RN Lisa Kurland Maria Jirwe |
| author_sort | Jason P. Murphy |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Abstract Aim This study explores HICGs’ experience of disaster response during a terrorist-induced major incident major incident. Design A qualitative descriptive design with individual semi-structured interviews was used. Methods This was a qualitative study based on seven individual interviews. Participants were members of hospital incident command groups during a terror attack. The interviews were transcribed verbatim and analyzed using deductive content analysis. The SRQR checklist was used to report the findings. Results The data created from the interviews identified barriers and facilitators for hospital response as well as aligned with previously established categories: Expectations, prior experience, and uncertainty affect hospital incident command group response during a Major Incident and three categories, (I) Gaining situational awareness (containing two subcategories), (II) Transitioning to management (containing three subcategories) and (III) Experiences of hospital incident command group response (containing two subcategories). In addition, the results suggest that an exaggerated response may have led to unanticipated adverse events. Clinical trial number Not applicable. |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj-art-9552d00ff1954814a2c29b8bf448036a |
| institution | Kabale University |
| issn | 1471-227X |
| language | English |
| publishDate | 2025-02-01 |
| publisher | BMC |
| record_format | Article |
| series | BMC Emergency Medicine |
| spelling | doaj-art-9552d00ff1954814a2c29b8bf448036a2025-02-09T12:16:06ZengBMCBMC Emergency Medicine1471-227X2025-02-012511910.1186/s12873-025-01173-4Does the “state of disaster” response have a downside? Hospital incident command group leaders’ experiences of a terrorist-induced major incident: a qualitative studyJason P. Murphy0Anna Hörberg1Monica Rådestad RN2Lisa Kurland3Maria Jirwe4Department of Diagnostics and Intervention, Umeå UniversitySchool of Health and Welfare, Dalarna UniversityDepartment of Clinical Science and Education, Karolinska InstitutetDepartment of Medical Sciences, Örebro UniversityInstitution for Health Sciences, Swedish Red Cross UniversityAbstract Aim This study explores HICGs’ experience of disaster response during a terrorist-induced major incident major incident. Design A qualitative descriptive design with individual semi-structured interviews was used. Methods This was a qualitative study based on seven individual interviews. Participants were members of hospital incident command groups during a terror attack. The interviews were transcribed verbatim and analyzed using deductive content analysis. The SRQR checklist was used to report the findings. Results The data created from the interviews identified barriers and facilitators for hospital response as well as aligned with previously established categories: Expectations, prior experience, and uncertainty affect hospital incident command group response during a Major Incident and three categories, (I) Gaining situational awareness (containing two subcategories), (II) Transitioning to management (containing three subcategories) and (III) Experiences of hospital incident command group response (containing two subcategories). In addition, the results suggest that an exaggerated response may have led to unanticipated adverse events. Clinical trial number Not applicable.https://doi.org/10.1186/s12873-025-01173-4Hospital incident commandDisaster medicineDisaster preparednessDecision-makingMajor incident |
| spellingShingle | Jason P. Murphy Anna Hörberg Monica Rådestad RN Lisa Kurland Maria Jirwe Does the “state of disaster” response have a downside? Hospital incident command group leaders’ experiences of a terrorist-induced major incident: a qualitative study BMC Emergency Medicine Hospital incident command Disaster medicine Disaster preparedness Decision-making Major incident |
| title | Does the “state of disaster” response have a downside? Hospital incident command group leaders’ experiences of a terrorist-induced major incident: a qualitative study |
| title_full | Does the “state of disaster” response have a downside? Hospital incident command group leaders’ experiences of a terrorist-induced major incident: a qualitative study |
| title_fullStr | Does the “state of disaster” response have a downside? Hospital incident command group leaders’ experiences of a terrorist-induced major incident: a qualitative study |
| title_full_unstemmed | Does the “state of disaster” response have a downside? Hospital incident command group leaders’ experiences of a terrorist-induced major incident: a qualitative study |
| title_short | Does the “state of disaster” response have a downside? Hospital incident command group leaders’ experiences of a terrorist-induced major incident: a qualitative study |
| title_sort | does the state of disaster response have a downside hospital incident command group leaders experiences of a terrorist induced major incident a qualitative study |
| topic | Hospital incident command Disaster medicine Disaster preparedness Decision-making Major incident |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1186/s12873-025-01173-4 |
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